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Abstract—We study the cost-sharing problem among indepen-
dent service providers in a service capacity pooling system. The
effective improvement of such pooling system can be achieved
by reducing the resource idleness in case of congestion. In this
paper, we model both the service provider and the cooperative
coalition as a single server queue. We attempt to answer the
following questions: (i) which coalition strategy should be used;
and (ii) which allocation rule should be selected in order to
maintain the stability of the coalition? In particular, we consider
the service pooling with a fixed service capacity for M/G/1
service systems. The benefit of the pooling system is due to the
shortened waiting queue in the overall system. We develop the
corresponding cooperative game with transferable utility, and
analyze the core allocations. Although it is difficult to express
a core allocation explicitly for the game, we prove the non-
emptiness of the core. We give a reasonable expression of Equal
Profit Method to distribute the cost for our game, and investigate
a number of cost allocation rules under three typical situations to
evaluate the gain of the service pooling strategy for each service
provider. The numerical results show that the cost allocation rule
proposed gives a reasonable cost-sharing result considering the
contribution of each participant.
Key words: service pooling; queueing systems; cooperative
game theory; core allocations; general service times
I. INTRODUCTION
Services play an important role in the world economy.
Based on the report from the office of United States Trade
Representative, four out of five jobs in US are proposed by
service industry [1]. In France, service presents the biggest
sector of the economy and accounts for 79% of total GDP
according to statistical data from the World Bank. In the con-
text of economic globalization, competition and cooperation
in service industries are more and more popular in nowadays:
price competition among fast food restaurant chains, operation
combination of telecommunication companies, collaborative
after-sell and maintenance services in electronic manufactur-
ing industry etc. In this paper, we focus on the collabora-
tion benefit between several independent service providers in
terms of capacity sharing. In order to make service systems
more efficient, there are several basic cooperative methods:
queueing cooperation, e.g., scheduling among simultaneous
arrival agencies or rerouting among different servers [2], [3];
service pooling, e.g., service rate pooling or staffing allocation
[4]; cross-training [5]; collaboration with third-party service
providers, e.g., service outsourcing [6], etc. In some cases,
different methods can be combined to form a more profitable
collaborative structure [7]. Under certain conditions, service
providers could earn more revenue or reduce expenses by using
the collaboration methods mentioned above.
All the previous methods can be classified broadly into
three typical cooperation forms: vertical form, i.e., collabo-
ration between customers and servers; horizontal form, i.e.,
collaboration among homogeneous servers; and external form,
e.g., collaborative outsourcing. We focus in this study on hor-
izontal service pooling among independent service providers.
The obvious gain is the mitigated congestion in the cooperative
system, owing to the disappearance of servers’ idleness with
waiting customers in the queues. Altogether, the coalition
service set is more efficient than individual ones. The pooling
advantage for the whole system is apparent, but the collabo-
rative gain of the entire alliance cannot be the incentive for
each individual service provider to join the coalition. It is
therefore important to address the following questions: which
independent service providers should collaborate together; and
how to share the cost of the pooling system among the
participants to keep each individual staying in the coalition?
In this paper, we consider a set of independent single-server
service providers, each of which faces its own incoming stream
of customers/demand. Customer inter-arrival and service times
are assumed to be random and distributed independently. We
suppose that an individual incoming stream is strictly unrelated
to those of other providers. This means that there is no
competitive relationship among service providers in the set.
The providers in the coalition could then join a profitable
coalition by operating their service capacities in common.
Alternatively, each provider could make his own decision
independently to either join any coalition or not, based on
his individual benefit. Once the coalitions is formed, the most
important problem in the entire coalition for every independent
provider returns to a cost-sharing problem under collaboration.
Cooperative game theory provides interesting concepts to
find profitable coalition structures and solves the cost sharing
problem among cooperative players. We assume that the total
cost is a transferable utility, e.g., money in the general case.
The corresponding cooperative game with transferable utility
(TU-game) is defined among the set of independent service
providers, and has a characteristic function defined by the total
operating costs associated with each coalition for the cases of
fixed system capacity. In order to make a profitable service
pooling strategy, we prove that the system total cost could
be minimized in the grand coalition. Therefore, as mentioned
above, we focus on the cost-sharing problem to guarantee the
stability of the grand coalition.
There exists a large literature focusing on the cooperative
behavior among independent participants using cooperative
game theory: [8] is the earliest research that deals with the cost
allocation problem for operating-theatre sharing in medical
service. The authors separate the operating-theatre costs as
variable and fixed cost, and focus on the Shapley value of two
sub-games. In [9], the authors address an extension of [8], con-
sidering preemptive priority for the customers from different
individual servers to provide a more profitable pooling system.
Our work is inspired by two recent papers [10], [11], which
study the service capacity pooling problem using cooperative
game theory. Two similar general M/M/1 service pooling
systems have been considered in these two papers. [10] uses
the optimal service rate that minimizes the system operating
cost, in addition, an incomplete information problem has been
treated here. In [11], the authors choose a variable service rate,
which varies with customer incoming rate. Based on a system
performance defined in terms of the mean number of waiting
customers in the system, authors give the expressions of all
cost allocation rules. With the work of [12], [13], the service
cost allocation problem in [10] and [11] are extended to multi-
server settings with Erlang-B and Erlang-C queueing models.
Using an M/M/1 queueing modeling, several existing s-
tudies address the pooling, scheduling, staff allocation, or
outsourcing problems in service systems [2]–[4], [6]–[11]. In
this work, we extend the service pooling problem to the more
general case of M/G/1 systems. Although its prevalence in
practice, no studies of service pooling for M/G/1 systems
exist in the literature. Considering the efficiency and quality
driven in service systems, our system total cost consists of
the service capacity cost and the system congestion cost.
We prove that the service pooling game with a fixed service
capacity sharing always has a stable cost-sharing allocation for
the grand coalition. We attempt to consider the contribution
of each service provider to coalitions with the Equal Profit
Method proposed by [14]. With numerical experiments, we
compare the allocation method proposed using two different
contribution weights with the Shapley-value, the Tau-value, the
nucleolus and the Equal Profit Method. By a reasonable selec-
tion of the contribution weights for each individual participant,
this rule gives an attracted pooling gain for the participant with
a high contribution to the coalition, especially in the quality
driven condition.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
presents both the individual and collaborative modeling of
service systems. In Section 3, the service pooling problem
with a fixed service capacity is defined and analyzed as a
TU-game. Then, we propose a reasonable expression of Equal
Profit Method, and investigate the allocation method proposed
with a number of traditional cost allocation rules for our game
under three typical situations in Section 4. Finally, conclusions
and future work are presented.
II. SERVICE POOLING MODELING
We consider a set of n service providers, N = f1; : : : ; ng.
Each service provider i 2 N is modeled as a single server
queue handling a single class of customers. We assume that
the waiting space is large enough, no customer would abandon
after entering the system, and there is no fail in the service
processing, i.e., no retrial is considered here. The incoming
stream of customers/demand to the service provider i follows
a Poisson process, and the customers are served in the order
of their arrivals, i.e., under the first come, first served (FCFS)
discipline of service. The service times for a given service
provider are assumed to be identically distributed and allowed
to follow a general distribution. Following the above assump-
tions, the individual service process is modeled as an M/G/1
queueing system. For the total operating cost of an individual
server, we consider a traditional economic framework with two
types of costs [15]. The first type is a linear capacity cost per
unit time, which is proportional to the system service capacity.
This captures the equipment’s depreciation or maintenance
fee, employee’s salary, etc. We also assume a congestion cost
incurred for each unit time the customers spend in the queue.
For each service provider i, we then define the following
parameters:
 i: Mean arrival rate of customers for the provider i;
 Xi: A random variable describing the service time
at the server i, with mean 1=i and coefficient of
variation ci;
 i = i=i: Server utilization for the provider i, with
i > i;
 Wq;i: Customer expected waiting time in the queue
for the provider i;
 hi: Service capacity cost parameter per unit time for
the provider i;
 di: Congestion cost parameter per unit time per cus-
tomer waiting in the queue at the server i.
For any service provider i, we denote the capacity, the
congestion and the total costs per unit time by Hi, Di and Ci
respectively. Using the Pollaczek-Khinchin formula in [16], we
could write
Ci = Hi +Di = hii + diiWq;i
= hii + dii
iE(X
2
i )
2(1  i) :
(1)
The service capacity pooling consists of two typical meth-
ods with demand pooling. In the first one, the service providers
form a common facility with parallel-servers and one single
queue. All incoming customers are served in the multi-server
queueing system. In the second one, the service providers share
their service capacities together and run as a ”super-server”,
i.e., a single server with a high service capacity. We consider
there the second configuration. We assume that s independent
service providers of any subset ;  S = f1; : : : ; sg  N
would decide to share their capacities as a ”super-server” for
reducing the collective cost. We suppose that the component
arrival processes, with rate i for i 2 S, are independently
distributed. Therefore, the combined arrival process in the
pooling system, which has a rate S =
P
S i, also follows a
Poisson process. We suppose that the pooling system provides
same services to all customers, and the service times for the
pooling server follow a general distribution. We denote the
mean service capacity by S for the pooling system S. Based
on these assumptions, the s providers act as an M/G/1 ”super-
server” (Figure 1). By using the same technology and paying
Fig. 1. Centralized Coalition of a Set of Service Providers
at the same salary level, we assume here the service capacity
cost parameters to be the same hi = h, for all providers in
the set N . Because all the customers have equal importance
for the pooling system S, it is reasonable to suppose that
the system congestion cost parameters are equal, di = d, for
any provider in the set N . In particular, we assume that the
coefficient of variation of service times for all providers in the
set N are the equivalent cS;i = cS = cN . The total cost of
the pooling system S is the sum of service capacity cost and
system congestion cost as individual providers. Thus, for any
pooling system S  N , we define the parameters as follows:
 S : Mean arrival rate of customers for the pooling
system S;
 XS : A random variable, service time at the pooling
server S, with the mean 1=S and the coefficient of
variation cS ;
 S = S=S : Server utilization for the pooling system
S, with S > S ;
 Wq;S : Customer expected waiting time in the queue
for the pooling system S;
 h: Service capacity cost parameter per unit time within
the subset S;
 d: Congestion cost parameter per unit time per cus-
tomer waiting in the queue within the subset S.
For a pooling system S, we denote the capacity, the
congestion and the total costs per unit time by HS , DS and
CS , respectively. The expected total cost per unit time is given
by
CS = HS +DS = hS + dSWq;S
= hS + dS
SE(X
2
S)
2(1  S) :
(2)
With all definitions above, we propose both the individ-
ual service model and the pooling service model in M/G/1
queueing systems. Our objective is to verify the benefit and
the stability of service capacity pooling. It consists of two
steps: to confirm that the service capacity pooling brings
benefit to the whole set of service providers; to verify that
each individual service provider could get better interest in the
coalition structure with its distributed cost from the coalition
cost. Cooperative game theory provides a formal method to
formulate, structure and analyze the cooperative behavior of
independent individuals. In the two following sections, we will
build the corresponding cooperative game under the capacity
pooling strategy, in order to find the most profitable pooling
coalition structure and allocate the total cost of pooling server
to each independent service provider.
III. SERVICE POOLING GAME FOR M/G/1 SERVICE
SYSTEMS
In this section, we consider that the service capacity of
each individual service provider is fixed. This is a reasonable
assumption in several situations, where the changing of basic
equipment or physical location is too expensive or almost
impossible. We suppose that the pooling capacity S of any
subset S is the sum of service capacities of all members i 2 S.
Let us denote by Cfix(), the total cost function of a subset
S  N under the fixed service capacity pooling. With the
predetermined system parameters (h; d; cN ), we have
Cfix(;) = 0; Cfix(i) = Ci(i; i);
Cfix(S) = CS(S ; S =
X
j2S j):
(3)
Consider a finite set of independent service providers N =
f1; : : : ; ng (agents), which is known as the grand coalition in
cooperative game. Let S be any subset of N , and it is called
coalition of agents. In every coalition, the agents could reduce
their total costs by sharing their capacities together. We assume
that each service provider could only join one coalition, and
the pooling cost could be redistributed among the providers
with no limitation in the coalition. Thus, a cooperative game
with transferable utility (TU-game) (N;Cfix) is completely
specified by its characteristic function Cfix : 2N ! R
assigning to any non-empty coalition S.
To simplify the analysis of the game (N;Cfix), we define
f = c2N and rewrite equations (1) and (2) as follows.
Ci = hii + dii
iE(X
2
i )
2(1  i)
= hi +
d(1 + f)
2 1i (
 1
i   1)
; for any i 2 N ; (4a)
CS = hS + dS
SE(X
2
S)
2(1  S)
= hS +
d(1 + f)
2 1S (
 1
S   1)
; for any ;  S  N: (4b)
Note that the capacity holding cost and the system conges-
tion cost, both are single-variable functions in either the service
capacity, or the server utilization. We denote the expected
queue length of coalition S by Lq;S . Proposition 1 states the
effectiveness improvement of service quality in terms of Lq;S
in the pooling system.
Proposition 1. The expected queue length is strictly subaddi-
tive in the pooling system with a fixed service capacity.
Proof . For any ;  S; T  N with S \ T = ;, we suppose
that S  T . Then, the utilization of the pooling server S[T
has the property: S  S[T  T . And the queue length
Lq;S = (1 + f)=[2
 1
S (
 1
S   1)] is an increasing function in
0 < S < 1. Thus, Lq;S  Lq;S[T  Lq;T . So Lq;S[T <
Lq;S + Lq;T . The subadditivity of expected queue length has
been proved.
From Proposition 1, we find that the average number of
waiting customers is always reduced in the pooling system.
The proof above also shows that Lq;S is not monotone, the
joint queue length may be increased with new number joining,
e.g., when provider i joins coalition S with S < i. This
property is similar to that in the M/M/1 service pooling game
proposed by Anily in [11]. We now present the two main
results for the game (N;Cfix) analysis in Theorem 1 and 2.
We start with the most profitable coalition structure of the
game (N;Cfix).
Theorem 1. The service pooling game (N;Cfix) is a strictly
subadditive game, and the grand coalition is the most profitable
coalition structure.
Proof . In the total cost function Cfix(S) = HS + DS =
hSS+dSLq;S , HS = hSS is additive, and DS = dSLq;S is
strictly subadditive based on proposition 1. It is clear that Cfix
is strictly subadditive, so (N;Cfix) is a strictly subadditive
game, and any splitting of the grand coalition means an
additional congestion cost for the entire set N . Therefore, the
grand coalition N is the most profitable coalition structure for
the game (N;Cfix).
Subadditivity is a necessary condition required for the
formation of the grand coalition. Theorem 1 states that there
is always a benefit if two service providers or pooling systems
share their service capacities as a ”super-server” with a fixed
service capacity. When each provider maintains its individ-
ual server with its own capacity, it has to pay its capacity
cost and the individual congestion cost. In the context of
resource pooling, each participant could save money in the
collective congestion cost. Although the profitability of the
grand coalition is affirmed by Theorem 1, the existence of
stable cost allocation has not been confirmed yet. In order
to encourage every provider joining the grand coalition, our
interest now is to find a stable allocation rule to share the
reduced congestion cost in the coalition derived from service
capacity pooling. One of the important properties for the stable
cost allocation analysis is the concavity of cost games in the
following definition.
Definition 1. A TU-game (N; v) is concave if:
(i) For any pair of subsets ;  S  T  N , and any agent
l 2 NnT , v(S [ flg)  v(S)  v(T [ flg)  v(T ); or
(ii) For any pair of subsets ;  S; T  N , v(S [ T ) +
v(S \ T )  v(S) + v(T ); or
(iii) For any pair of subsets S  T  N nR, v(S [R) 
v(S)  v(T [R)  v(T ).
If (N;Cfix) is concave, the non-emptiness of the core
and the existence of population monotonic allocation scheme
(PMAS, which presents a dynamic solution for all sub-games)
would be ensured. Unfortunately, the following example illus-
trates that the game (N;Cfix) is not concave in general.
Example. Consider the case where h = 0 (because of the
additivity of capacity holding cost, this assumption does not
affect the final result), d = 1 and f = 0:2, a set N = f1; 2; 3g
of three service providers, and the other parameters as defined
in Table I.
We use the same arrival and service rates as that in the
example of [10]. There are big differences among service uti-
lizations of each agent in this situation. By choosing S = f1g,
T = f1; 3g with l = 2, we obtain Cfix(S [flg) Cfix(S) =
TABLE I. 3 PLAYERS POOLING GAME
Agents
Parameters
i i Ci
1 9 10 4:86
2 5 10 0:3
3 2 10 0:03
TABLE II. COALITIONAL AND DISTRIBUTED COSTS
S Cfix(S)
P
i2S x
sh
i
f1,2,3g 0:37 0:37
f1,2g 0:98 1:33
f2,3g 0:11  1:52
f1,3g 0:4 0:91
 3:88 < Cfix(T [flg) Cfix(T ) =  0:03, meaning that the
game (N;Cfix) is not concave in this setting.
In Table II, the total cost of each coalition and the
corresponding costs of Shapley-value allocation, which has
xsh1 = 1:88, x
sh
2 =  0:54 and xsh2 =  0:97, are computed
for every coalition S 2 N with jSj  2. We find that
Cfix(f1; 2g) = 0:37 < xsh1 +xsh2 = 1:88+( 0:54) = 1:34, al-
so, Cfix(f1; 3g) = 0:4 < xsh1 +xsh3 = 1:88+( 0:97) = 0:91.
It means that the Shapley-value allocation is not stable in this
case, although the pooling contribution of each agent is well
shown by this allocation. Meanwhile, the general proportional
allocation rule xpi = piCfix=
P
j2N pj , depending on the
initial individual service capacity (pi = i) or the own
customer arrival rate (pi = i), also could not guarantee the
stability of the grand coalition N .
In order to keep all agents staying in the coalition, we
should find at least one stable cost allocation if it exists.
Unfortunately, we could not give an explicit stable cost-sharing
solution for the game (N;Cfix). However, we prove the
existence of the stable cost allocation solutions. To prove the
non-emptiness of the core, we use the ”Bondareva-Shapley
Theorem” [17] (B-S Theorem), which is well known in non-
empty core demonstration for TU-games: ”A TU-game (N; v)
has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced”. The
following definitions are the relevant notions of balancedness.
Definition 2. A collection B on N is a balanced collection, if
for any S 2 B, it exist its weights S to make
P
S2B S1S =
1N . This equation is equivalent to
P
S3i S = 1, for any i 2
N .
Definition 3. A cost TU-game (N; v) is a balanced game,
if for any balanced collection B on N , we have v(N) P
S2B Sv(S) (v(N) 
P
S2B Sv(S) for profit games).
For the balancdness proof of the game (N;Cfix), we use
the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The expected waiting time Wq(S ; S) in the
queue is a decreasing and convex function in S with a fixed
S for S > S .
Proof . We have @Wq=@S =  S(1 + f)(2S  
S)=[2
2
S(S S)2] < 0 and @2Wq=@2S = S(1+f)[2S +
3S(S S)]=[3S(S S)3] > 0, for S > S . So,Wq(S)
is decreasing and convex in S .
With Proposition 2, we are prepared to prove the non-
emptiness of the core for the game (N;Cfix).
Theorem 2. The service pooling game (N;Cfix) has a non-
empty core, and there are infinitely many solutions in the core
if n > 1.
Proof . The game (N;Cfix) could be divided into two
games: the game (N;Hfix) with Hfix(S) = hS , which
is a linear game, and the game (N;Dfix) with Dfix(S) =
dLq(S ; S) = dSWq(S ; S). It is clear that (N;Hfix)
has a core with one core allocation. Now, we will prove that
the game (N;Dfix) has a non-empty core by B-S Theorem.
For any balanced collection B on N , we have:
Dfix(N) = dNWq(N ; N )
= dNWq(N ;
X
S2B
SS
N
S
 S
N
) (5a)
 dN 
X
S2B
S
S
N
Wq(N ; S
N
S
) (5b)
=
X
S2B
SdSWq(N ; S
N
S
)
=
X
S2B
SdS [
1 + f
2
 1N
1
 1S (
 1
S   1)
]
<
X
S2B
SdSWq(S ; S) (5c)
=
X
S2B
SDfix(S):
From the definition of a balanced collection, there isP
S2B SS = N to guarantee the equality in (5a). Mean-
while, the inequality in (5b) holds by the convex property of
Wq(S ; S) in Proposition 2 and
P
S2B SS = N based
on Definition 2. Since S is a subset of N , the inequality in
(5c) holds.
Thus, the game (N;Dfix) is a balanced game. According
to the B-S Theorem, the game (N;Dfix) has a non-empty
core. Using Lemma A.2 of [12], we could simply state that:
if n > 1, the game (N;Cfix) has infinitely many core
allocations. The proof of the theorem is completed.
From Theorem 2, we could conclude that the service
pooling game (N;Cfix) with a fixed service capacity always
has a cost allocation to guarantee the stability of the grand
coalition. Thus, the grand coalition is the most profitable coali-
tion solution in the context of capacity pooling. For the further
results of the individual pooling costs, the explicit numerical
solution of the game (N;Cfix) could be computed by a Linear
Programming method, e.g., the Equal Profit Method in [14] or
the Nucleolus computing [18].
IV. COST-SHARING IN M/G/1 POOLING SYSTEM
Obtaining a stable allocation is one important objective of
the service pooling problem. We denote the cost allocations
of the grand coalition by x = fxi; : : : ; xng for the cost
TU-game (N;Cfix). The stable allocation rule should be
efficient
P
i2N xi = CN and justified by coalition rationalityP
i2S xi  CS for any subset S in N . In this section, we
propose a reasonable expression for Equal Profit Method, and
compare the expression proposed with another rules and its
original form by numerical experiments.
A. Cost allocation rules
1) Shapley-value: The Shapley-value, introduced by Shap-
ley in 1952 [19], is a popular allocation concept in cooperative
game theory. It provides us with a well-known fair allocation
rule for cooperative games, but there is no general property
to keep the stability of the grand coalition. The Shapley-value
is defined as the average marginal cost of each cooperative
subset for each participant, and it is given by
xshi =
X
SNnfig
jSj!(jN j   jSj   1)!
jN j! [CS[fig   CS ]; (6)
where CS[fig   CS is the marginal cost of provider i as
the last player joining the coalition S. Shapley-value is the
unique allocation rule satisfying the four desirable properties:
anonymity, efficiency, additivity and dummy player property.
In order to verify the Shapley-value is a core allocation for
a cost cooperative game (N; v), it is sufficient to test the
concavity of the characteristic function v, which has been
proved by [20]. Unfortunately, the game (N;Cfix) defined
here is non-concave and the Shapley-value couldn’t guarantee
the stability of grand coalition in general.
2) Tau-value: The set of cost allocations, defined by the
lower bound Mi(N;Cfix) = CN   CNnfig and the upper
bound mi(Cfix) = maxS:i2SfCS  
P
j2SnfigMj(N;Cfix)g
of the shared cost, includes all the core allocations. The  -
value, defined by Tijs in 1981 [21], is a cost allocation defined
as
xi = mi(Cfix) + (1  )Mi(N;Cfix); (7)
with the unique  2 [0; 1] calculated by the efficiency of
x . It is a special linear combination of Mi(N;Cfix) and
mi(Cfix). For two player games, the  -value is equal to the
Shapley-value and it presents a stable cost allocation for all
quasi-balanced two player games. Although we could not give
an explicit demonstration of its stability, the  -value proposes
stable results in the following experiments.
3) Nucleolus: The excess of a cost allocation x for a
coalition S  N is defined as
ex;S = CS  
X
i2S xi; (8)
which is been used to measure unhappiness of the coalitions
by the lexicographic ordering comparison for all possible
allocations. When the coalition cost is allocated by x, S is
more satisfied with a higher ex;S . Based on the concept of min-
imized maximum unhappiness, the Nucleolus was introduced
by Schmeidler in [18]. Although Schmeidler didn’t define it
explicitly, its uniqueness has been proved by Driessen in 1969
[22]. It is a stable allocation rule for all TU-games with a non-
empty core, and coincides with dummy player property, zero
independent and reduced-game property.
4) Equal Profit Method: Another interesting definition of
”fair” is the equal profit concept, which defined by Frisk et al.
in 2010 [14]. They describe the cost TU-games as a linear
programming problem to minimize the gap of the relative
savings ri = (Ci   xi)=Ci.
min f(x)
s.t f(x)  maxfri   rjg; 8i; j 2 NX
i2S xi  CS ;8S  NX
i2N xi = CN ;
(9)
where the results xEPM defined as the core allocation calcu-
lated by Equal Profit Method (EPM). It seems to be a ”fair”
and stable allocation rule considering the most closed relative
savings for each individual, despite the different contribution
of each participant to the grand coalition N . This ”fair”
definition just considers the individual factor. In some cases,
the participant, which has a low individual payment, might do
not want to join the coalition in order to protect its individual
information, although it could get a same level relative saving
with others.
5) EPM based on Contribution Weights: Now, we define
the relative contribution weights wi = i=(i   i) for each
participant in our service pooling game. The customer arrival
rate i describes the individual requirement of each participant,
and the system idle capacity i   i presents the individual
contribution to the collaboration. Then, we propose the new
relative saving formula as
rwi = wi  Ci   xi
Ci
=
(Ci   xi)
(  )Ci : (10)
Thus, we get the EPM with Contribution Weights (EPM-
CW) as
min f(x)
s.t f(x)  maxfrwi   rwjg; 8i; j 2 NX
i2S xi  CS ;8S  NX
i2N xi = CN :
(11)
With the constraints defined in equation (11), EPMCW
presents a stable allocation rule by solving the linear program-
ming problem above, if the core is not empty. The contribution
of each provider has been considered in the relative contribu-
tion weights wi, and the results are easily controllable by wi
with different definitions, e.g., wi = 
2
i =(i   i).
B. Numerical results and analysis
We illustrate the previous concepts in three typical service
pooling cases of 6 service companies, which have equal
individual service capacities. To do so, we consider the three
following sets of data with different h 2 [0; 1] (the variation
of the three system parameters h; d; f have similar impacts
on the results). The first case presents a set of companies
TABLE III. CUSTOMER ARRIVAL RATES AND SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Initial data Customer arrival rates
 h d f No. 1 2 3 4 5 6
10 [0; 1] 2 0:2 1 2 3 3 4 3:5 4
- 2 7 9 8 7 8:5 9:5
- 3 2 7 4 7:5 9 3
with low server utilizations. It means that all the companies in
this set are not very efficient. There are both the low efficient
companies and the busy companies in the second case. And
the third one only consists of the busy companies. The initial
parameters for each set are listed in Table III.
Fig. 2, 3 and 4 reveal the distributed costs, using different
preceding concepts described in IV-A , for our game (N;Cfix)
in the cases above under h = 0, i.e., the quality driven case.
We select two different relative contribution rates for EPMCW
calculation: wi for EPMCW1 and wi for EPMCW2. From
these figures, we find that the results given by the  -value
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Fig. 3. Cost allocations of case 2 under h = 0 by Shapley-value, Tau-value,
Nucleolus, EPM, EPMCW1 and EPMCW2
and the nucleolus are very close, especially in the third case.
The Shapley-value reflects the contributions of each provider
for all the possible coalitions. Unfortunately, the corresponding
allocations are not stable in all the three cases, e.g., xsh1 +x
sh
5 =
1:2811  Cf1;5g = 0:8067 in the case 3.
EPM provides a stable allocation rule, which is a little
far from the others for several companies, particularly for
the company with relative large or small contribution to the
coalitions. The goal or the ”fair” defined by EPM is to
minimize the gap between the relative earnings of players,
and the constraints consists of all stable requirements. Thus,
the companies with a special contribution might not satisfy
the similar relative saving. For example, the first company in
Fig. 4, which has a low individual operating cost, will pay
nothing by EPM computing, but it could earn money in other
allocations.
TABLE IV. RELATIVE SAVINGS ri FOR CASE 1 WITH DIFFERENT
RULES UNDER h = 0 AND 0:5
h = 0 Shapley Tau-v Nucl. EPM E-CW1 E-CW2
Com 1 173:0% 128:5% 110:5% 84:7% 164:0% 164:0%
Com 2 92:6% 84:3% 84:9% 85:0% 104:7% 79:8%
Com 3 92:6% 84:3% 84:9% 85:0% 104:7% 79:8%
Com 4 74:3% 81:9% 83:5% 84:6% 68:1% 81:5%
Com 5 80:3% 81:9% 82:7% 85:1% 84:2% 79:9%
Com 6 74:3% 81:9% 83:5% 84:6% 68:1% 81:5%
Stable No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
h = 0:5 Shapley Tau-v Nucl. EPM E-CW1 E-CW2
Com 1 2:05% 1:52% 1:31% 1:94% 1:94% 1:94%
Com 2 2:77% 2:52% 2:51% 3:14% 3:14% 3:14%
Com 3 2:77% 2:52% 2:51% 3:14% 3:14% 3:14%
Com 4 4:47% 4:93% 5:02% 3:94% 3:82% 3:82%
Com 5 3:48% 3:55% 3:58% 3:94% 4:19% 4:19%
Com 6 4:47% 4:93% 5:02% 3:94% 3:82% 3:82%
Stable No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EPMCW1 and EPMCW2 give closed results in Fig. 3
and 4, but they propose very different results in Fig. 1. In
these figures, we find that the EPMCW2 is more closed to
the Shapley-value. It seems like wi presents a more suitable
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Fig. 4. Cost allocations of case 3 under h = 0 by Shapley-value, Tau-value,
Nucleolus, EPM, EPMCW1 and EPMCW2
contribution weights than wi defined in equation (10). With
same individual service capacities used for all companies, this
phenomenon could be explicated by the characteristic function
Cfix of this service pooling game defined in equation (4). It is
easy to find that the second contribution weights wi are more
closed to the individual operating cost Ci.
Table IV shows the relative savings ri for each distributed
cost obtained by the previous rules and compared to the
individual costs in the set of low efficient companies (the case
1 in Fig. 2). When h = 0, the service capacity pooling brings
a large relative saving to all companies. The relative difference
is large between the result of EPMCW1 and EPMCW2. While
the relative saving declines, h = 0:5, the difference between
EPMCW1 and EPMCW2 reduces. If the relative saving is
small enough, e.g., h = 1 with rN  3%, the two allocations
given by EPMCW and the allocation of EPM are very similar.
V. CONCLUSION
Using cooperative game theory, we have approached the
cost sharing problem among a set of independent service
providers in the complete service capacity pooling system.
We extended the service pooling game in M/G/1 service
systems. When the service capacities are fixed, the service
pooling game would be a sum of two games: an additive
service holding cost game and a subadditive service congestion
game. We have proved that the stable cost allocation always
exists. Thus, the stable numerical cost allocation could be
derived using linear programming computing for any cases.
Considering the contribution and requirement of each service
providers, we propose an improved expression of Equal Prof-
it Method, the Equal Profit Method based on Contribution
Weights. We have applied it in our M/G/1 service pooling
cases. With numerical experiments, we found that it provides
a reasonable stable allocation rule, which could reflect the
contributions of each participant in the coalition.
There are possible generalizations and complementarities
that can be taken in future research. In our setting, (h; d; f)
are system parameters. Because of the problems based on the
localization, it is also reasonable to suppose that di is spe-
cialized for each service provider. The expected waiting time
could increase by service capacity pooling for several service
providers. For this, we could not guarantee the subadditivity of
the congestion cost. In this way, the grand coalition may not
be the most profitable coalition structure for this new game.
Thus, the coalition formation problem should be considered in
the service pooling game study.
It would be also interesting to extend the analysis of this
paper to the case of service systems with customers aban-
donment or callback. Indeed, the abandonment is a common
phenomenon in service systems. The customers will abandon
with the unsatisfying of the real waiting times. Thus, the
stability requirement  <  is not necessary. Considering
the callback of the fail/unsatisfying demand, it is necessary
to propose a fair indicator to evaluate the quality of services.
There are a few options here: the customers waiting times,
the service times, the probability of failure, etc. It will be
an interesting future research to analyze the properties of the
relevant games.
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